Competing conceptions of justice

A Theory of Justice versus Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

This essay aims to discuss two recent theories of justice which have caught attention for their novel features. The first, A Theory of Justice, published in 1972 by John Rawls, has attracted wide-spread acclaim within academic circles. It offers a rational justification of ideas of justice, and advances the radical claim that what matters most in society is the plight of the worst-off. The second, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by Robert Nozick, although repudiated for its promotion of a minimal state, has a chapter on justice which denies that the State should go beyond the protection of liberty in order to achieve distributive justice.

Rawls puts forward what seems a very simple theory of justice, containing just two principles. The first is the “liberty principle.” That is, each person would be equally entitled to the most extensive set of basic liberties compatible with a similar liberty to others. This would include the sort of civil and political rights which form the backbone of Western liberal democracies. Rawls prioritised this over the other principles. The second bifurcates to leave the “fair opportunity principle,” and the “difference principle” or “just savings principle”. The former stipulates that all offices and positions must be open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, while the latter focuses on the distribution of income and wealth in society. Here, Rawls polemicized against the prevailing orthodoxy. Until then, it was the received wisdom among Labour politicians, particularly in the 1940s, that public policy was “fair” so long as it benefited the whole of society. Crucially though, the Rawlsian twist meant that social and economic inequalities are justified only in so far as they benefit the least advantaged. It is not enough that they raise the floor if gap between it and the ceiling continues to increase. So there is a sense that fairness requires an equal distribution. Any departure from this must advantage literally all the individuals in society. For example, inequalities which are to everyone’s benefit, namely a competitive economy with higher wages going to the most productive people. Such a system might yield incentives and could potentially find a place under the Rawlsian model. Overall then, at an even deeper level than the constitution, we should abide by these principles and arrange our social and economic institutions accordingly.

But Rawls did not just pluck these ideas out of the air. Rather, he developed a line of argument which makes use of a hypothetical social contract. We are to imagine rational persons meeting in an “original position” to choose among alternative principles of justice. These in turn determine the distribution of burdens and benefits in society. He requests that these principles be chosen from behind a “veil of ignorance”, meaning that the participants would possess knowledge of the general laws of psychology and the social sciences, but they would not know the historical date or the geographical location of the society. Nor do they know anything about the individual capacities or social position of themselves of others. Put simply, they would be made ignorant of their role in society. This, he believed, could remove vested interests from a conception of justice. Quite often, people disagree about justice because they are biased by their own interests. More affluent elements, accordingly, tend to occupy a different stance on taxation to the more deprived persons. However, if you didn’t know what your role in society would be – and you couldn’t be sure whether you would be a manual worker or city banker - what wage differentials would you tolerate?

The argument is premised on three important assumptions about self-interested rational agents. The first is that like Hume, Rawls regards society as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage”. Whereas a Hobbesian interpretation finds that individuals desire scarce goods, provoking a conflict of interest, Rawls holds that society is also marked by an identity of interest, because everyone stands to gain by having access to the various goods that social activity can provide. If there were no such “social cooperation”, there would be no occasion for justice, since there would be no joint product, or common institutions (e.g. enforceable property rights), to which conflicting claims and principles could apply. The second is that the persons are not envious. This translates as only being concerned with maximising their primary goods, and not perceiving the thought-experiment as zero-sum gain. Thus, instead of concentrating on the relative amounts of different parties, they should purely the highest amount possible of primary goods for themselves. Third, it is assumed that the participants have a conservative attitude towards risk, and will opt for the least disadvantageous outcome, given that they are unaware of their inclination to gamble.

There are, however, objections to this theory. Throughout the book, the onus rests with Rawls to show why his set of principles would be chosen by self-interested rational agents. While the “safety first” attitude is axiomatic for Rawls, critics have maintained that some degree of gambling is rational. Accordingly, an initial principle of equality appears rational for contractors faced with the veil of ignorance, for it will ensure that they are not disadvantaged if they land up in one social position rather than another. Likewise, it makes sense for them to recognize departures from equality for the sake of improvements to all social positions. Yet it is not clear why these departures should focus upon the least advantaged as the recipients for additional benefits. Compassion might feature in an intuitive notion of justice, but why should it form part of a rational calculation on the part of self-interested individuals? In response, Rawls claims that a rational agent must assume that he has an equal chance of ending up at the bottom of the pile or at the top. This understanding should council principles which maximise the position of the worst off, just in case it should turn out that they are the worst off, in terms of talents and skills in any future society. For Rawls, the “maximin” – maximum benefit for the least advantaged - applies in situations of uncertainty when individuals have no knowledge of the probabilities of various outcomes occurring. This then would rule out the most reckless gambling; surely no rational agent would choose to be stranded in the gutter or in a state of starvation. Nonetheless, a choice between extreme gambling and zero-risk is a false binary. Better still, argue Utilitarians, to present the choice as one between a bland, egalitarian society, where nobody struggles, and a mixed welfare-capitalist society where nobody will fall below the standard of basic subsistence, many will be in a position of adequate comfort, and a few lucky people win the lottery. The second would allow the participants the chance to compete for the glittering prizes, but with a basic safety net to catch the losers, ensuring that they do not fall below the poverty line. Rawls though still supposed that they would play it safe. Faced with their total life prospects, it would be too dangerous to engage with such a high risk strategy, since, under Rawls’s conditions, nobody could know where they might land on the pile. In part, this may have been motivated by a romantic socialist idea about money being of limited importance.

Another objection arises because people can still smuggle-in their beliefs, primarily because this experiment was couched in the halls of Harvard, by liberal philosophers with overlapping value-systems. In actual fact, this highlights an inconsistency the argument for the reason that it places liberty over material comfort. Assuming total blindness, it is more likely that a self-interested rational agent would prioritise staying alive over liberty, just as the starving man in Africa would prefer a full belly to voting rights. A functional explanation might find that liberty takes precedence precisely because the spokesmen of our values have never faced starvation. Nonetheless, Rawls still holds to his formula: “ignorance to model impartiality”. If people are stripped of their prejudices, then, and only then will they be able to make objective choices about society. But the question remains: what should they be made ignorant of? Should they be unaware of liberty? In answer to the question, Rawls said that it must be assumed that people value primary goods. That is, liberty, opportunity, social bases of self respect, income and money. Even so, some have argued that these are still purpose – means of achieving the good life.

If the only justified inequalities are those that enhance the well-being of the least-advantaged, then does not Rawls’s doctrine unfairly penalise those who choose to exercise their talents? From a behaviouralist perspective is there not a problem of ‘moral hazard’- that is, that policies designed to aid the least- advantaged have a tendency to encourage the size of that group to grow? To avoid this obstacle, Rawls takes account of incentives, and wage differentials as an insurance policy against the dependency culture that his critics fear. Incentives should be considered not by their impact on the total size of the economic pie, but on the effect of the wellbeing of those at the bottom. For instance, at the point where robbing Peter to pay Paul begins to discourage Paul from working, ultimately harming his interests, this would be unjust.

Where does leave the notion of effort? Surely those who strive to perfect their talents deserve some reward. However, Rawls rebuts this argument on three levels. First he impresses that even a work ethic relies on all sorts of natural or socio-cultural contingencies for which we can claim no credit. Second, he points out that effort does not necessarily attach to moral desert. Take two construction workers: One is strong and can raise four walls in an hour, while the other is weaker and must spend three days working to achieve the same end-product. No defender of meritocracy will look at the second builder, and say he deserves to earn more. Thus it is not really effort that is the moral basis of distributive shares, for society often judges by actual and not merely probable results, just as its criminal law punishes more severely the evil intention which is followed by evil consequences, than the evil intention which fortunately miscarries. In actual fact, claims of merit are most readily acknowledged when the meritorious achievement is socially useful. This underlines the circularity, since, the contribution that an individual is capable of making is largely dependent on his natural talents and abilities, for which he is not responsible. Lastly, this raises the issue of market contingencies; that society and the market economy value a certain type of talent. Consider setting the clocks back 10,000 years to a hunter society. The talents of the present would be of little use in this forerunner society. True, some of us would acquire new talents, but others would be lost. And whereas they would be entitled to less, they would be no less worthy. Equally, just because least advantaged in today’s society posses fewer of the talents that society decides to reward does not make them less deserving. Rawls resolves this by distinguishing moral desert from “entitlements to legitimate expectations”. Moral desert is an antecedent standard. “A just scheme answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded on social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportionate to or dependent on their intrinsic worth.” Therefore, we are entitled to the benefits that the rules of the game promise for the exercise of our talents. But it is a mistake to assume that we deserve a society that values the qualities we happen to have in abundance.

Nozick on the other hand contends that justice is an unpatterned, historical theory. Unpatterned, because rather than seeing distributive justice as a requirement to shape society according to a predetermined pattern (of equality, or of rewarding merit, or of meeting needs) it should be understood historically; this, in place of Rawls’s “end-state” theory. For Nozick, justice should be regarded as the upshot of free choices that individuals have made. It is according to these past actions that they should be rewarded. As an entitlement theory, the distribution of individual property holdings (or goods) is fair if (a) it is justly acquired (b) it has been justly transferred, or (c) it is the rectification of an injustice, the correction of an acquisition or transfer which was not itself just. If these criteria are met, the distribution must be a product of people trading in their holdings. Any state intervention would engender a situation which is not the result of a free exchange, simultaneously causing a breach of rights. Naturally then, all welfare programmes are rendered unlawful. Further, Nozick develops an argument about self-ownership which serves as a direct attack on the common pool of assets which Rawls advocates. Indeed, taxing to form public service programmes against the will of individuals is a form of coercion, tantamount to theft. But as Rawls points out, maybe we do not own ourselves in an absolute sense. Handing a carte blanche to the state, containing permission to commandeer our lives would be inconsistent with the liberty principle. Even so, we lack a privileged claim on the benefits that flow from the exercise of our talents in a market economy. This line of reasoning allows us to defend rights and respect the individual without embracing the idea of self-possession.

Under this theory, endorsement of the entitlement conception leaves no room for the addition of a patterned plan. This is rationalised using a powerful example. Assuming a starting point with an equal distribution of goods, a champion sports-star contracts to join a particular team for a year, on the proviso that 25 cents from the price of each entry ticket should go to him. Clearly a popular move, huge crowds flock to see the spectacle, willingly paying the requisite amount in return. At the end of the year, he has attracted one million fans, earning himself $250,000 in the process, a considerably larger income than anyone else. The equality has not persisted. But if the original distribution was just, is not the final position also just? Every fan was given his equal share to use as he pleased. Any complaints at the outcome would have to be directed at the choices of the individuals who acted in such a way as to make the sports star rich. This demonstrates that the entitlement theory is a valid feature of justice, yet does not go so far as to exclude a distributive aspect.

Nevertheless, Nozick’s conception is not without fault. It hardly addresses the great disparity in good fortune arises by chance, and not as the result of deliberate choice on the party of those involved. Once again, the Rawlsian argument is a useful point of reference, since, to reinforce the “veil of ignorance” argument, Rawls also evidences the iniquity associated with natural and social contingencies. The contention is that the distribution of income, wealth and opportunity, should not be based on factors which are arbitrary from a moral point of view, and therefore, for which people can take no credit.

He explains this by means of an impressive illustration, which considers several rival theories of justice. First, he assesses a feudal aristocracy, where people’s life prospects are wholly determined by an accident of birth. Bad enough that individuals can be born into deprived families; far worse that they are not afforded the opportunity to ascend the social ladder. Hence, whether you are a peasant or noble, slave or slave-holder determines the opportunity you are faced with. The Libertarian system marks an improvement because it rejected the predetermined nature of accident of birth. As a result, formal equality is introduced, meaning that jobs and careers are open to all. But this does not extend insight far enough. Now, everyone can run the race, albeit with starting points. The weakness exists because it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by factors which are arbitrary from a moral point of view, for example, education or a happy family background. Next, under a meritocratic system institutions would be arranged to bring everyone to the same starting points, probably translating into equal educational opportunity. Even this though is not sufficient to remedy the moral arbitrariness of the genetic lottery. At this moment, everyone features at same starting point of race, but the fastest runners are still bound to win. However, they did not earn the right to be blessed with the athletic ability to run fast. This may eliminate the influence of social contingency (income and wealth) but again fails to remove natural contingency. Finally, Rawls says that it is necessary to go beyond the notion of merit and desert. First he scrutinises the egalitarian conception, which claims that it is necessary to handicap the fastest, for instance, by making them wear lead shoes. Nonetheless he rejects levelling equality. Instead he pioneers the “democratic conception” that the gifted should still be allowed to exercise their talents, simply on different terms. He establishes principle which reveals that people may benefit from their good fortune, just on terms that benefit the least well off. So David Beckham can earn his millions, but only under a system which taxes a chunk, to redistribute it to those who lack the football skills he is blessed with. “Those who are favoured by nature may gain from it, only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out”.

In essence, the chief deficiency of the political marketplace is that people enter it with unequal resources, not only in terms of the physical assets that they possess at the start but also the differences in natural talents (plus luck) that earn them continuously higher incomes than those who are not so well-endowed. The solution offered is not to penalise the success stories, but to spread the proceeds of their achievements throughout society. It is plain that Rawls’s analysis of distributive justice is a version of the equality-needs concept. It makes equality basic and then emphasizes the needs of the poor when justifying departures from equality. As a system of pure procedural justice, once the principles are unanimously agreed upon, whatever distribution emerges is necessarily just. Finally, the account mentions an idea of “reflective equilibrium”, meaning that we must constantly check the conclusions of our moral reasoning against our intuitive moral notions, revising the conditions of the original position as necessary. We may never reach a consensus on the most comprehensive moral questions about the “good”, but at least this can help us reach a consensus on what is “right”. It is this, he argues, which must take precedence in our moral reasoning.

Overall, neither conception can be our judicial silver bullet. Although Nozick fails to dent the claims made by Rawls, closer examination of the Rawlsian conception still exposes some of the proverbial issues at the heart of any theory of justice.

Disadvantage

What should governments do to help the disadvantaged in society? Yet even this presupposes the more fundamental question of who are the disadvantaged?

Part of the project is to come to understanding of disadvantage, and the ways in which life can go badly. The ‘capability view’ advocates that there are roughly ten major categories of functioning, and that the good life is one which involves representation from all of these categories. These include life, bodily health (often interpreted as access to healthcare) bodily integrity- not being subject to attack on leaving the house- sense, imagination, thought, (linked to education), autonomy, control over environment (including political power), and perhaps, somewhat controversially, leisure time.

As an extension, risk and vulnerability are relevant. It matters not simply what an individual is capable of in the short term but what can be sustained over the future. Take
two people- both on the same income- where one has a permanent job, and the other although earning similar wages, has no job security, and cannot safely assume he will have work in the near future. The fact that employment is insecure with the latter means one is clearly disadvantaged relative to the other. The consequence could be insecurity, opting to undertake significant risks, or not engaging fully- i.e. not being willing to start a family, or take out a mortgage- for fear of breaking the bank in the absence of a reliable income. So the thesis depends on fact that you are disadvantaged when you are forced to take risks.

It has been estimated that the best way to evaluate the problem is to use a sporting analogy; that of decathlon scoring, where the average disadvantage is measured over ten events. Definitively, the loser will be the one who is worst-off. Visible traits may include being unemployed, bad health, poor homes, extreme poverty, all of which will lead to being near the bottom however the weighting takes place.

Government has a duty to create atmosphere in which disadvantage can be improved. The aim is to neutralise, or where possible remove disadvantaged clusters to create an environment brimming with equality of opportunity. Success is achieved when there is no correlation between the decathlon events- and where different people come out top in different disciplines, making them all roughly equal. And where disadvantage no longer clusters this is the ultimate mark of success.

In addition to the disadvantaged clusters, privileged clusters are prevalent with similar ramifications. Accordingly those who have good jobs will also have good health, good homes, and good holidays.

The way to improve the situation is to eliminate the so-called corrosive disadvantages. This is when a single detriment leads to another, for example when a lack of affiliation to a community lends itself to poor health, because there may not be anyone to look after the ageing individual. Not quite the opposite but, fertile functions are when possession leads to good effects, such as literacy helps finding a well-paid job which in turn pays for other necessities such as education or healthcare.

There is cause for optimism because recently, the conservative perspective has been more amenable to interfering to address the problem. Now, there is a consensual starting point for social intervention.

Consequentialism

'The end justifies the means' is a common phrase. It suggests that consequences should determine the value of the actions, and more often than not, is cashed out in terms of the balance of happiness that will result from undertaking, or refraining from an action- e.g. will a given lie on balance maximise happiness? This is repeatedly contrasted with the theory of duties and obligations- e.g. that we should avoid lying at all costs, regardless of the circumstances, because of some moral responsibility.

Consequentialism is an umbrella term for a family of moral theories, all of which evaluate acts, rules, and social institutions according to their consequences. The most familiar by far, is Act Utilitarianism which addresses consequences of acts (as particular decisions) in an effort to maximise ‘utility.’ According to this theory, the ‘right’ acts are those which produce most happiness and welfare. Therefore, in maximising happiness, it might be advisable to implement a system of capital punishment in order to create a deterrent to would-be criminals. So harm inflicted on a small number would prevent latent criminals from causing a greater happiness deficit to society in general.

But suppose there is a situation where I owe you money. Most happiness might be derived by giving it away to a stranger in redistributive fashion. But common sense hints that this would not be appropriate because there was a contractual agreement stipulating that I should pay you.

The way around these murky waters is to adopt so-called Rule Utilitarianism, which says that utility should be used to assess rules, and rules ought to be used to consider acts. The theory examines society, and finds that breaking rules incurs more long-term harm than sticking to them and thus the corollary is that happiness is maximised where people observe rules, and keep their promises. Therefore, people must abide by the rule even if it does not necessarily maximise happiness directly. This can appear to be a complete separation from concentrating on the utility of an act, if the primary consideration is governed by convention. However, there exists a distinction between mere rule-worshipping, and Rule Utilitarianism. Essentially it does not matter what label you give the theory, but more its plausibility meaning that despite the fact that it may not be strictly-speaking Utilitarian, it remains a viable guide to morality. Suffice to say that a rule might be something like ‘break any other rule in order to prevent disasters.’

Utilitarianism is often found abutting deontological and virtue ethics. The former holds that people have fundamental rights- which should be safeguarded even if this means disregarding happiness and welfare, and the latter focuses more on character, rather than actions. These leading theories are left to fight over our common sense moral intuitions. These intuitions exist principally on three levels, from certain restrictions- not to torture or steal- obligations- such as family, friends, and promises- and about doing good in general. The theories are effectively competing over the universal ground- that which relates to intuitions on all levels- and can act as an ethical guide irrespective of the given situation.

Many argue that ultimately, Consequentialism is the most plausible because it makes the best stab regarding common sense morality. Undoubtedly, there are problems such as the degree to which Act Utilitarianism- maximising happiness-comes at expense of self-interest. Imagine for instance that a man is approached by an Oxfam charity collector. Willingly he gives £5, but the woman asks about other £5 pounds in his pocket, which he accordingly hands over. The follow up is ‘but what about car keys?’ As a result, it is very difficult to see how he can stop short of impoverishing himself. The net benefit associated with the act of generosity would imply that he had to keep giving- because the act would be benefiting others more than it would cost. However, it is noticeable that very soon, he would have degraded his living standards significantly. The implication here is that morality requires extreme sacrificing. Rule utilitarianism again holds the solution; on the other hand it says that Joe Bloggs can give 10% of salary to charity and stop there- and still satisfy all his moral intuitions. According to Rule Consquentialism, people should stand by the rules and established social norms unless there are apparent better alternatives.

Crucially, happiness should not be the only important ‘consequence.’ Some claim that relevant factors should include those of non-sentient beings, as well as fareness. Whatever is included in the definition, it is clearly an idea which allows us to confront moral decisions with a dependable framework.

Multiculturalism

The Phenomenon of mass migration has made the tension between liberalism and multiculturalism one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary political theory. Multiculturalists believe that members of minority groups should have the right to live their lives as they see fit. But what happens when certain minority values clash with those of the majority?

Multiculturalism expresses the notion that popular identity matters, and so attempts at ignoring or disparaging cultural identity are akin to harm. The repercussions of this ideal infer that it is inappropriate to expect everyone to adopt the practises, traditions, and values of the dominant group. The public policy implications impress that it is likely that the laws and institutions will tend to reflect the values of the dominant group, and it is a bias which has to be justified and undone.

It derives from principle of toleration; that we demonstrate a disposition to put up with things (or people) of which we disapprove, in situations where we have the capacity to intervene but choose not to. It is based on the idea that individuals have the right to autonomy- and should be free to determine their own ideals, exempt from interference. Therefore, the theory suggests that society should respect other culture’s view of the ‘good life-’ relating to the classically liberal notion ‘of every man to his own.’

But apart from the liberalist justification, there is perhaps another avenue which comes to the aid of multiculturalism, because what is ‘right’ for one person might not necessarily be ‘right’ for another. I may believe that killing animals and eating them is ethically acceptable, whereas you might believe that this act is inhumane. This raises the question whether the realm of morality ‘different.’ Is there a definitive answer to morality? Can we defend the idea of a single moral truth? Is the diversity a sign that there is no single truth, just a matter of taste?

Subjectivism, suggests that every individual will have different moral stances according to their experiences from which they derive their opinions. The corollary of this is that we can both be correct in our assumptions regarding what is ‘right.’ This lends weight to the multliculturalist argument because many advocate that individual differences, often culturally given, mean that there is no cultural reality. Partly because there is no absolute value to our actions implying that culture is a matter of personal taste, meaning that we cannot seek to alter the outlook of others, and also because individuals have a fundamental right to maintain their beliefs, multiculturalism has so much to offer.

Hobbes on the State

If humans lived in a state of nature, put simply a condition in which there was no political organisation or power, there would be catastrophic war and anarchy.

At least according to Hobbes, who made his mark witting The Leviathan around the time of the civil war. It was a book discussing the relationship between citizen and the state, in which it was argued we should cede power to protect us to a mighty sovereign.

The Leviathan can be characterised as a theory of the state. In context, at the time Hobbes composed his work, the state was commonly associated with the notion of popular sovereignty- where it was the name of the ‘body of the people’ organised for political power. Crucially, he repudiated the fundamental assumption that the people exist as a single, unified body.

His premise was illustrated with what became a celebrated piece of iconography. Taking a human body, the state was shown as having sovereign as its head, but being made up of all individual members as the body. The point being that they all exist as individuals, and attain an artificial unity through the sovereign head. So it reverses idea that body politic creates a state, saying it is only through having a sovereign that you have a 'body of the people.'

The background to the Leviathan lies in the breakout of the civil war of 1642. It was a response to the lawless nature of society and a guide so that people should understand how to produce peace instead of war.

Ostensibly it sets out a thought experiment investigating the contract of government. But perhaps the thought experiment is more than reverse engineering, and is meant to serve as a warning that life a without law, inevitably equals war. It starts with the 'state of nature' in which everyone exists just as individuals. An egalitarian, Hobbes believed that we all desire the same things- scarce goods- and that we have the same powers to obtain things.

The result is a war of everyone against everyone in which everyone is constantly liable to sudden death, in which the natural life of man is solitary, brutish and short. Circumventing this problem requires therefore that we take steps to talk to each other to avoid war. In doing so, we come to share the view that sudden violent death is intolerable; this consensus is the keystone for state, relating back to the idea that 'Fear of death is beginning of wisdom.'

The covenant is each with each, whereby we all covenant that someone should be our sovereign, thereby creating an artificial person; a representative of ourselves. It recognises that someone’s will must count as the will of everyone. The demands are that whereas I used to act according to my will, I will now operate according to yours. In the state of nature, society fails to function because there is a conflict of interest between individuals and the state, due to the fact everyone retains all their freedoms, regardless of how they impact upon others, and impinge on the rights of those around you. The covenant means giving up practically all your rights to ensure peace, especially any right to exercise discretion in respect of law. Consequently, the sovereign’s will now counts as your will.

It would appear thus far to be an authoritarian state in that it details the abandonment of your will to another. But as Hobbes emphasises, there stark choice is between subjection and death. For that reason, the role of monarch is to create an artificial unity of the people, in which the will of sovereign counts for everybody, rather than to represent interests of each and every. This fictional entity created by sovereign is called the state.

This is not the idea where the body of the people appoints a sovereign representative as an executive arm of the people; that of popular sovereignty. Instead, the people ask the sovereign to represent them, and an analogy is drawn to the court of law, where it is the role of the legal system to acquit us. Similarly, the sovereign should keep the peace with sovereign power vested in it, in a form of representative government.

We have inherited his tradition, and every 5 years we appoint representatives, giving them sovereign power to determine our interest’s thereby imparting power to make decisions on our behalf.

Finally, we do not always have to obey will of sovereign, because we must not give up rights which are indispensable to maintaining our lives, or else, why would you enter the state? Essentially, we keep hold of the liberty to act against call of state if it would endanger your existence. As such, conscription is refutable because it is dangerous and could result in death.

So the state is something other than body of the people, otherwise we would have direct democracy. Instead we have representative democracy, where the state is name of fictional body which embodies our values in order to maintain peace.

Political Representation

Should our political leaders mirror the society they govern? Should they be made to reflect the demographics of gender, and race, to make them a more accurate representation of who we are?

Up to ten percent of our population are left-handed, so should 10 percent of our political representatives also be left handed. This seems ridiculous, but is there something significantly different about gender or race that justifies a quota when it would be absurd for left handers?Does the gender or race of a political leader matter, or is what matters their views and competence? After all, a progressive male may be more supportive of say, childcare than a reactionary female.

Nowadays, society is too large- in terms of civilian population- to sustain a participatory democracy whereby everyone congregates to make important decisions as a single unit. This system has been replaced by political representation, where others are selected to represent us on our behalf. Forgetting accountability, it is important that these decision-makers, are an accurate reflection of society at large. But in what sense are they truly representative. We tend to think that they are representative if they roughly correspond to voting patterns for political parties. But to what extent are they representative in terms of gender and race?

Essentially it is a question of ideas and presence. Currently, the determining factors are based around whether representatives share our policy priorities, or the key features on the political agenda. However, some would say that fair representation demands equality of presence as well. They claim that quotas are needed to ensure that the playing field for those entering the sphere of politics is level. This is based on the idea that women for example have different experiences to males, and have a unique insight into society. By this logic, it is imperative that they are involved in the political process, so that this segment of society is accurately represented.

Most would not beg to differ on this topic. But when it comes to quotas- an apparatus for guaranteeing that a certain group can attain a minimum proportion of positions- they become more sceptical. They see quotas as a warped target- something inherently anti-meritocratic- which has no objective value. Yet gender inequality still exists. It does so, because often the established circles are exclusive, and can be a men's club. Women accordingly find it difficult to find a foothold on the ladder of progress, and are instead stuck languishing in the realms of underachievement. In addition, a formal prompt (in the form of a quota) can be required to offer the extra persuasion that discrimination of this sort no longer exists. Quotas are only one example of affirmative action, but their use has been met with unmitigated success. Norway have implemented a quota mandating a minimum of 40 percent women on all boards of management. This has radically changed the appearance of these previously-chauvinistic territories, leading to increased female participation and application.

Quotas are not designed to discriminate against white-middle-class males, but rather to offer a helping hand to those who would otherwise not find themselves with equality of opportunity. There is nothing stipulating that they must be a permanent fixture. On the contrast, they can be temporary, and removed as soon as they have achieved their objective.

Admittedly, there are dangers. Namely the beneficiaries of the quota system become free-riders, knowing that their very presence meets a target. Alternatively, the recipients feel degraded at having been chosen simply on the basis of their skin colour or sex. although, studies have shown these concerns have not materialised.

Quotas conform to the principle of gender balance. It argues for a fair and equal distribution that gives access to power and influence. The argument that quotas act to distort reality lacks a sense of history. If equality really matters, then it is our duty to take action so that it is more than an ideological whim.

Terrorism denied publicity

Should terrorists be permitted to promulgate their views?

Terrorism is perceived as a pernicious influence because of what it stands for; namely violence, coercion and anti-democratic practises. It exploits the impressionable within society, and abuses the platform lent by freedom of expression in preaching hatred, and inciting violence. So would it be right to have a rule depriving terrorists of this platform, therefore thwarting the spread of their message?

When the media show hostage videos, or broadcast terrorist atrocities, it provides terrorists with the 'oxygen of publicity' which they would struggle to live without. These acts are designed to inspire fear in the civilian population, and by averting the publication of this message, it would not only minimise damage to society, but ensure that the demands of terrorists are not met. Terrorists would no longer be able to bring illegitimate pressure to bear on governments, and would lose a vital battle in the war for hearts and minds. It could perhaps be claimed, with some justification, that with the advent of the internet, it is no longer possible to control what enters the public domain. But while this may be true with fringe sites, it is wrong for two reasons. Firstly, the majority receive their news from mainstream sites, which are manageable in terms of regulation. They would comply or risk losing their reputation as a reliable broadcaster. Secondly, and more profoundly, it would set a precedent rejecting the acts perpetrated by these organisations, and reinforce the message of non-negotiation.

And preventing terrorists from achieving their objectives would have another benefit. It would also succeed in preventing future attacks, by neutralising their strategy, rendering their powers of intimidation useless.

Terrorism attacks are designed to play on the public's mass psychology. In broadcasting their attacks, the threat is exaggerated and blown completely out of proportion. The consequence is a climate of fear in which people wildly overestimate the danger they pose. This creates a further problem in that it licences further infringements of civil liberties, and yet more incursions into our rights by the state. The anti-terrorist legislation is a prime example of how the state has taken advantage of the public mood to enforce what is ostensibly undemocratic legislation. The climate of fear leads to the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups within society, as fear the public backlash they will be subjected to. This is a move in the exact opposite direction to harmonious dynamics, and will only contribute to less cohesion, and integration.

And by stopping the broadcast, it removes a powerful recruiting tool from the armoury of terrorists. They could no longer claim to trigger public sympathy as a basis for drawing people into the folds of murder and homicide. and equally, the incentive of martyrdom is eliminated from the agenda. All these steps would galvanise public opinion against terrorism, and make society a safer place. Free speech is only 'free' up to a point-it is a contingent right- and one that comes with certain responsibilities. If terrorists refuse to adhere to these guidelines, then they should forfeit their right to these fundamental 'rights'